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IC 75-1378  
25 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: [ ] Memo on Technology  
Exchange Problem of 21 February 1975

1. I wish to comment on this paper because (a) it proposes that PRD prepare an ambitious study and (b) I disagree with the notion that the Intelligence Community has a major role to play in this area (a notion mentioned, though not sanctioned, by [ ])

2. If I read this paper correctly, we (the Community and IC Staff) are roughly back where we started more than a year ago. None of the issues raised then seem to have been resolved despite studies, [ ] proposals, and USIB consideration. I do not think that another study by us is going to advance matters any further.

3. The principal question facing us and the Community seems to be, as [ ] puts it, "Should the Community have a role in policing technology losses, and, if so, through what channels and in what manner?" It is hard for me to imagine that some USIB agencies still advocate precisely such a role, a role which, among other things, <sup>would</sup> involve the Community in what could only be described as a domestic intelligence activity. Policing technology losses implies controls on US exporters of technology, and I would say that this is clearly verboten.

4. Even aside from this sensitive issue, such a service is not in accord with the traditions and the objectives of the US Intelligence Community. Further, I can not imagine any of our consumers assuming that such an activity is within the purview of, e. g., CIA and the DCI.

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5. And, beyond this, even were all the above objections overruled, I cannot imagine any bigger bottomless can of worms-- who would police and how, and, pray tell, with what resources?

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6. There are, however, several other issues addressed by [ ] which are legitimate and which the Community must ponder: (a) Should the Community become involved in a net assessment function with respect to military-related technology? (b) How does the Community keep abreast of what is going on in the area of technological exchanges? (c) [ ]  
[ ] (d) Should the Community seek to exploit collection opportunities offered <sup>by</sup> the increasing number of Soviet visitors to the US?

7. I do not think any of these questions require deep study. Although I cannot say how any additional responsibilities can best be assumed, I think it is clear that the Community (e. g., the NIOs) should assist the development of net assessments; that the Community must make a larger effort to keep abreast of what is going on; [ ]

[ ] and certainly the Community should seek to exploit the growing number of Soviet visitors to this country [ ]

8. Whether all this suggests that the [ ] should become a regular USIB committee or not is beyond my ken. I should think that matter could best be resolved by you, in accordance with your notions about the USIB community structure in general. Again, if I may drive this point into the ground, this will not require an IC Staff study.

9. I wish to endorse [ ] thoughtful, final paragraph, which suggests that the issue could be touchy, either, as he says, <sup>because</sup> ~~that~~ it could be construed to impinge on detente, or because it could

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be seen as interference in policy in general (by State, Treasury, and Commerce), and because of the sensitive domestic political implications alluded to at the outset of this memorandum.

[Redacted]

Chief, PRD/IC

**Distribution:**

Original - D/DCI/IC

① - IC Registry

1 - [Redacted]

1 - PRD Chrono

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DCI/IC-75-0539

21 FEB 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT : Talking Paper on the Technology  
Exchange Problem

1. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. The U.S. policy decision to actively promote technology exchanges with and exports to the USSR has been made. It can be argued that these exchanges and commercial protocols with the USSR are a primary detente foundation.

b. Because of the US/USSR bilateral agreements and protocols, the scope of the exchange program has significantly expanded and the number of Soviet visitors to the United States has multiplied.

c. The State Department has decentralized its method for handling exchange matters. There is no longer a real Exchange Staff, as in the past, and the Intelligence Community representatives no longer have the close contact which once existed with officials dealing with exchange problems.

d. Eleven executive agencies currently are responsible for monitoring the numerous scientific and technical agreements.

f. Management of technology flow from the United States is primarily a Department of Commerce responsibility.

g. The State Department has no authority to refuse commercial visits.

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## 2. THE PROBLEM

a. In the face of the explosively expanding flow of U.S. technology and products to the USSR and its allies, what is the proper role of the Intelligence Community?

Should the Community have a role in policing technology losses, and, if so, through what channels and in what manner?

[Redacted]

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Should the Community become involved in a net assessment function with respect to military related technology, with emphasis on the high technology products and production know-how which are especially important for strategic military programs?

[Redacted]

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If the Intelligence Community is not to be involved in net or damage assessments and in support of measures where needed to stem or control the export of militarily important U.S. technology and technological data, where does the responsibility really lie?

Should the Intelligence Community respond only to State Department requests for information, but otherwise remain passive concerning the impact of technology losses through exchanges?

In a situation as dynamic as the current exchange program, how does the Community keep abreast of what is going on?

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Should the Community aggressively seek to exploit collection opportunities posed by the increasing numbers of Soviet visitors to the United States?

The Intelligence Community exists primarily for its contribution to the national security and welfare--and the basic problem in the technology exchange field is how Community judgments can be developed and made relevant to the U.S. decision-making process.

### 3. POSSIBLE ACTIONS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

c. A third approach would be to have the Office of the Secretary of Defense request that a NSSM be prepared to explore the proper role of the Intelligence Community in the technology flow problem.

d. Still a fourth approach would be for the D/DCI/IC to request that the DCI establish an ad hoc task group including the chairman of [ ] but not composed of specialists such as are now members of the [ ]. The task group would be directed to explore the proper role of the Intelligence Community with respect to the question of U.S. loss of technology important to strategic military programs.

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25X1 e. All of the foregoing should be considered, but  
it might well be that the proper first step would be  
the preparation of an IC study which goes into the  
paper which goes into the problem area more deeply than  
has been done in this memorandum. If this is done, I  
suggest that [ ] of PRD be so tasked.

25X1 4. Overall, I think the important thing is that a  
determination be reached as to the proper role of the  
Intelligence Community [ ]  
25X1 [ ] and then consideration  
can be given as to whether [ ] should become a permanent  
USIB committee or some other organizational mechanism be  
devised to enable the Community to address its role.

5. The situation is undoubtedly going to be touchy,  
since the impression can develop that the Intelligence  
Community--if it seeks to enlarge its role--may tend to  
undermine detente arrangements. This aspect of the situation  
will have to be carefully addressed.

[ ]  
Chief  
Coordination Staff, ICS

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25X1 1 - PRD/ICS [ ]  
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25X1 DCI/ICS, [ ]  
(21 Feb 75)

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